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NAFTA AND MEXICO-U.S. MIGRATION:
POLICY OPTIONS IN 2004
Philip Martin*
ABSTRACT
EXICO'S population almost doubled between 1970 and 2000,
from 53 million to 100 million. During this period, the number
of Mexican-born U.S. residents increased more than tenfold,
from less than 800,000 to 8.5 million. The North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), which went into effect January 1, 1994, aimed to
free up trade and investment between Canada, Mexico, and the United
States, and thereby speed up economic and job growth in all three coun-
tries. Trade and investment increased in the 1990s, but economic and job
growth in Mexico were uneven.
One hoped for side effect of NAFTA was a reduction in unauthorized
Mexico-U.S. migration. This did not happen: the number of unautho-
rized Mexicans in the United States rose from an estimated 2.5 million in
1995 to 4.5 million in 2000, an annual increase of 400,000 a year. Mexican
President Vincente Fox, elected in July 2000, made a Mexican-U.S. migra-
tion agreement that better protected Mexicans in the United States, espe-
cially unauthorized Mexicans, one of his new government's top priorities,
and in February 2001, Fox and U.S. President George Bush established a
high-level working group to create "an orderly framework for migration
which ensures humane treatment [and] legal security, and dignified labor
conditions" (White House, 2001).
Fox's government proposed a four-point migration plan that included
legalization for unauthorized Mexicans in the United States, a new guest-
worker program, cooperative measures to end border violence, and
changes in U.S. law that would exempt Mexico from U.S. immigrant visa
ceilings. In presenting Mexico's proposal, Foreign Minister Jorge Cas-
taneda, in June 2001, said: "It's the whole enchilada or nothing"
(Zoellner, 2001). The U.S. government seemed willing to embrace his-
toric changes in Mexico-U.S. migration management, although perhaps
not the whole "enchilada." United States Secretary of State Colin L.
Powell, in September 2001, reported that: "We've made a great deal of
progress with respect to principles. We are now getting ready to move
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from principles into specifics and programs, and how would one design
such programs" (Powell, 2001).
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks stopped the Mexico-U.S. mi-
gration discussions. There has been both continuity and change in migra-
tion since the terrorist attacks. Mexico-U.S. migration continues at
historically high levels despite stepped up border controls, and many in
both Mexico and the United States decry the loss of life at the border and
the employment of millions of unauthorized Mexican workers in the
United States. However, a new emphasis on ensuring that foreign ter-
rorists do not arrive legally or illegally, the movement of the INS into the
new Department of Homeland Security, and a recession in both Mexico
and the United States, have combined to reduce the impetus for a new
Mexico-U.S. migration agreement.
There have been three major policy options discussed in the United
States to better manage Mexico-U.S. migration-guest workers, earned
legalization, and legalization. None is a panacea for unwanted migration.
Instead, the best set of options include: (1) Mexico-U.S. government co-
operation to build trust and establish a secure and efficient border, en-
hanced efforts to attract remittances and maximize their development
impacts in migrant areas of origin; and (2) pilot guest worker programs
that include economic incentives for U.S. employers to reduce reliance on
unskilled Mexican guest workers over time as well as incentives for them
to return when their work visas expire.
I. EVOLUTION OF MEXICO-U.S. MIGRATION
Migration has been the major relationship between Mexico and the
United States for most of the twentieth century, but legal immigration
remained low until recently-36 percent of twentieth century Mexican
immigrants arrived in the 1990s, and 34 percent of the apprehensions of
unauthorized Mexicans were in the 1990s (Table 1). Over the past cen-
tury, Mexican migrants were negatively selected, that is, those who left
Mexico usually had less education and skills than the average Mexican.
In addition, most of the Mexicans who arrived had first their first U.S.
jobs in seasonal agriculture (Martin, 1993). The United States and Mex-
ico had bilateral agreements to regulate Mexico-U.S. labor migration be-
tween 1917-1921 and 1942-1964, but most twentieth century Mexican
migrants arrived and were employed outside these bilateral guest worker
programs.
A standard treatment of Mexico-U.S. relations through the 1980s is en-
titled Distant Neighbors, reflecting the lack of economic integration and
cooperation on migration and other issues, sometimes summarized in
Mexico as "Poor Mexico, so far from God, so close to the U.S." The
picture changed in the 1990s, as the Mexican government liberalized its
economic policies, proposed NAFTA to formalize its desire for closer ec-
onomic integration, and initiated discussions aimed at improving migra-
tion management, including the Binational Study (1997) to reach
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TABLE 1.
MEXICAN IMMIGRATION AND APPREHENSIONS: 1890-2001
Decade Immigrants Percent Apprehensions Percent
1890-1900 971 0% 0%
1901-1910 49,642 1% 0%
1911-1920 219,004 4% 0%
1921-1930 459,287 7% 128,484 0%
1931-1940 22,319 0% 147,457 0%
1941-1950 60,589 1% 1,377,210 3%
1951-1960 229,811 4% 3,598,949 8%
1961-1970 453,937 7% 1,608,356 4%
1971-1980 640,294 10% 8,321,498 19%
1981-1990 1,655,843 27% 11,883,328 28%
1991-2000 2,249,421 36% 14,667,599 34%
2001 206,426 3% 1,387,486 3%
Total 6,247,544 100% 43,120,367 100%
Source: INS Statistical Yearbook
Apprehensions record events, so one person caught three times is three
apprehensions
Apprehension data for 1921-30 is 1925-30; Mexicans are 95-98 percent of
those apprehended
consensus on the stock and flow of Mexican migrants and their impacts in
the aftermath of the approval of Proposition 1987 in California in 1994.
Government-approved recruitment of Mexican workers for U.S. jobs
has a long history. The United States government approved the recruit-
ment of Mexican workers during World Wars I and II to obtain additional
farm and railroad workers. These Mexican Bracero workers were admit-
ted by making "exceptions" to immigration rules that otherwise would
have blocked their entry. Both of the war-time Bracero programs were
ended unilaterally by the United States, in part because of pressure from
U.S. labor and civil rights groups arguing that the Mexican migrants de-
pressed wages and increased unemployment for similar U.S. workers.
Both Bracero programs were followed, with a lag, by rising illegal Mex-
ico-U.S. migration. Rural Mexicans in rain-fed farming areas had already
learned to go north for higher wages and jobs outside the programs, and
at first it was very easy to cross the border. The U.S. Border Patrol was
not established until 1924, and immigration laws in 1921 and 1924 that
restricted immigration from Europe did not apply to Mexico and the
Western Hemisphere.1 By 1930, Mexicans were estimated to be 70 to 80
1. It was during the 1920s that California farmers argued they needed continued ac-
cess to Mexican farm workers. The Farm Bureau asserted that "California's spe-
cialized agriculture [requires] a kind of labor able to meet the requirements of
hard, stoop, hand labor, and to work under the sometimes less advantageous con-
ditions of heat, sun, dust, winds, and isolation." Quoted in Fuller, 1940, 19840. A
Chamber of Commerce spokesperson testified to Congress in 1926: "We, gentle-
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percent of the 72,000 strong seasonal work force in California (Fuller,
1940, 19871). However, the 1930s Depression led to "repatriations" of
Mexicans to free up jobs for Americans and practically stopped Mexico-
U.S. migration, so that there were fewer Mexican-born U.S. residents in
1940 (378,000) than there had been in 1930 (641,000), according to the
United States Census.
During the 1930s, Midwestern Dust Bowl farmers moved to California
hoping to start anew. They found instead large, labor-intensive factories
in the fields that were accustomed to paying relatively low wages to sea-
sonal workers who had no other U.S. job options. John Steinbeck's 1940
novel, The Grapes of Wrath, gave an emotional impetus to the common
prescription for farm labor reform in the late 1930s, namely, to restruc-
ture southwestern agriculture in a manner that reduced its dependence
on migrant and seasonal workers. Alternatively, if factories in the fields
were maintained, reformers wanted the workers employed in them to be
treated as factory workers and covered under nonfarm labor laws.
The United States Senate's LaFollette committee recommended the
second option, treating large farms as factories and covering their work-
ers under labor laws, which was expected to raise farm wages and en-
courage mechanization.2 However, decades of low farm wages had been
capitalized into higher land prices, and landowners unwilling to see land
prices fall as a result of higher wages used the outbreak of World War II
to win a new Bracero program (Craig, 1971; Martin, 1996, Chapter 2).
During WWII, Braceros, prisoners of war, interned Japanese, and state
and local prisoners supplemented the farm work force. Their presence in
the fields sent an unmistakable signal to U.S. farm workers-economic
mobility would require occupational and often geographic mobility, or
getting ahead in the U.S. labor market would require getting out of farm
work.
The Bracero program expanded in the 1950s, when irrigation opened
new land for farming in the southwest, the cost of shipping produce by
truck from west to east fell with the interstate highway system, and the
baby boom increased the demand for labor-intensive fruits and vegeta-
bles. Western farmers assumed that Mexican or other foreign workers
would continue to be available at U.S. minimum wages and invested ac-
cordingly. 3 However, the Bracero program was ended unilaterally by the
United States in 1964, amid predictions that labor-intensive agriculture
men, are just as anxious as you are not to build the civilization of California or any
other western district upon a Mexican foundation. We take him because there is
nothing else available. We have gone east, west, north, and south and he is the
only man-power available to us." Quoted in Fuller, 1940, 19859.
2. Violations of Free Speech and the Rights of Labor. Hearings before a Subcommit-
tee of the U.S. Senate Committee on Education and Labor [The LaFollette Com-
mittee] Washington: U.S. Senate. Approx 12 volumes.
3. California has been the number one farm state since 1950, and displaced New
Jersey as the garden state supplying fruits and vegetables to eastern population
centers.
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would have to shrink, and that the commodities most dependent on
Bracero workers would have to follow them to Mexico.
The commodity in the spotlight in the early 1960s was processing toma-
toes. In 1960, 80 percent of the 45,000 peak harvest workers used to pick
the 2.2 million tons of the tomatoes used to make catsup in California
were Braceros, and growers testified that "the use of Braceros is abso-
lutely essential to the survival of the tomato industry." The Bracero pro-
gram ended in 1964, and 35 years later, 5,000 workers rode machines to
sort 12 million tons of tomatoes. Labor-saving mechanization was
spurred by the higher wages that followed the end of the Bracero pro-
gram and facilitated by the state government, which encouraged the Uni-
versity of California to develop a mechanical system for harvesting
tomatoes and established random sampling stations to test machine-har-
vested tomatoes and determine the price paid to the grower.4
There were many consequences of tomato harvest mechanization, and
some curtailed mechanization research. The number of workers hired for
the harvest fell by 90 percent, and the number of farms growing tomatoes
dropped 70 percent. Tomato harvesting machines were costly, and only
farmers with large acreages could justify purchasing them. These impacts
on farm workers and small farmers prompted suits against the University
of California alleging that taxpayer monies, whose purpose was to help all
rural residents, were instead spent on mechanization that displaced farm
workers and small farmers (Martin and Olmstead, 1985). Researchers
turned their attention elsewhere, and tomato mechanization proved to be
the exception rather than the vanguard of the labor-saving trend ex-
pected in the 1970s.
Mexico-U.S. migration was low during the late 1960s and early 1970s,
the "golden age" for U.S. farm workers. Farm wages rose sharply with-
out Braceros: Cesar Chavez and the United Farm Workers (UFW) won a
40 percent wage increase for grape pickers in 1966, increasing entry-level
wages from $1.25 to $1.75 an hour in the UFW's first contract (Table 2).
However, some of the ex-Braceros had become U.S. immigrants during
the 1960s, when a U.S. employer could issue a letter asserting that a for-
eigner was "essential" to fill even a seasonal farm job, and a foreigner
could use this offer of employment to become an immigrant. Ex-
Braceros, who became immigrants in this manner, received immigrant
visas printed on green cards, and were known as green-card commuters-
Mexicans who lived in Mexico and worked seasonally in the United
States.
4. It was important to have random testing to determine price. Processing tomatoes
today are worth about 2.5 cents a pound. When tomatoes were picked in fifty
pound lugs by Braceros, and each lug was worth $1.25, the loss was relatively mi-
nor if a lug was rejected for having too many green tomatoes or too much dirt. But
with machine-picked tomatoes arriving in 25-ton truck loads, a load is worth
$1,250, and random sampling stations were crucial to overcome the perennial
struggle between growers and packers over deductions for poor quality.
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TABLE/FIG 2. US AND CA FARM AND MANUFACTURING
HOURLY EARNINGS: 1965-2001
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As green-card commuters aged out of seasonal harvest work in the late
1970s, many sent their sons north, using false or altered green cards, or
simply entering the United States illegally. A smuggling infrastructure
soon evolved to provide information and move rural Mexicans to rural
America, and it was strengthened in the early 1980s by events in the
United States and Mexico. In the United States, the UFW sought an-
other 40 percent wage increase in 1979, when federal wage-price guide-
lines called for a maximum 7 percent increase. With no workers available
from UFW hiring halls, growers turned to labor contractors, many of
whom were green-card commuters, and they returned to their villages to
recruit unauthorized workers. The contractors stayed in business after
the strikes were settled, and competition between union hiring halls and
labor contractors to supply seasonal workers to farmers favored the con-
tractors, who increased their share of the farm labor market. The number
of workers under UFW contract dropped from 60,000-70,000 in the early
1970s to 6,000-7,000 by the mid-1980s (Mines and Martin, 1984).
In Mexico, there was a peso devaluation in 1982-83 that made work in
the United States more attractive. Apprehensions of Mexicans just inside
the Mexico-U.S. border reached their all time peak of 1.8 million in 1986,
meaning that the United States was apprehending an average of three
Mexicans a minute, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. In 1986,
two events occurred that, contrary to expectations, increased Mexico-
U.S. migration:
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" The United States enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA) of 1986 to reduce illegal immigration by imposing sanctions
on U.S. employers who knowingly hired unauthorized foreigners and
to legalize some unauthorized foreigners in the United States.
" Mexico changed its economic policy from import substitution to ex-
port-led growth. IRCA included two legalization or amnesty pro-
grams, and the legalization program for unauthorized farm
workers-the Special Agricultural Worker program (SAW)-was
rife with fraud-over 1 million Mexican men became U.S. immi-
grants under the SAW program by presenting letters from employers
saying they had worked ninety days or more in 1985-86 on U.S. crop
farms as unauthorized workers (Martin, 1994). There were about 6
million adult men in rural Mexico in the mid-1980s, and the SAW
program gave 1/6 of them immigrant visas. Their families were de-
liberately excluded from legalization, under the theory that SAWs
wanted to commute to seasonal farm jobs and keep their families in
Mexico, as had earlier green-card commuters (Martin, 1994).
The SAW workers did not behave as expected. Many switched to non-
farm U.S. jobs and settled in U.S. cities with their families; others had
never been farm workers and did not go into the fields. As state and
local government costs of providing education, health, and other services
to newly legalized immigrants and their often unauthorized families rose
during the early 1990's recession, there were suits against the federal gov-
ernment that sought to recoup state and local expenditures to provide
services to unauthorized foreigners. The perception that immigrants did
not pay their way culminated in Proposition 187 in 1994 and federal wel-
fare reforms in 1996. Meanwhile, SAW workers were replaced by newly
arrived, unauthorized workers in the fields.
II. NAFITA AND THE MIGRATION HUMP
NAFTA went into effect January 1, 1994, locking in place policies that
lowered barriers to trade and investment among Canada, Mexico, and the
United States. Most of the benefits of this freer trade were expected to
accrue to Mexico, in the form of more foreign investment, faster eco-
nomic and job growth, and increased exports. The most frequently cited
study of NAFTA's likely effects concluded that Mexican employment,
which was projected to be 30 million in 1995, would rise by 609,000, or 2
percent, because of NAFTA. Mexican wages were projected to be 9 per-
cent higher with NAFTA, largely because foreign investment (and Mexi-
can money staying in Mexico) was expected to raise the value of the peso
relative to the dollar, reducing the cost of imports (Hufbauer and Schott,
1992, pp. 47-64).
All studies agreed that most of the additional jobs due to NAFTA
would be created in Mexico. Some studies anticipated simultaneous job
creation and displacement in Mexico and predicted that the displacement
of workers from previously protected Mexican sectors such as agriculture
20051
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TABLE 3/FIG. LEGALIZED AND UNAUTHORIZED US CROP
WORKERS: 1989-2000
SAWs and Unauthorized Farm Workers: 1989-2000
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could lead to additional Mexico-U.S. migration.5 Hinojosa and Robin-
son (1991), for example, estimated that NAFTA would displace about 1.4
million rural Mexicans, largely because NAFTA-related changes in Mexi-
can farm policies and freer trade in agricultural products would lead some
farmers to quit farming: 800,000 displaced farmers would stay in Mexico,
and 600,000 would migrate (illegally) to the United States over five to six
years.
Hinojosa and McCleery (1992) developed a Computable General
Equilibrium (CGE) model to project adjustments in the Mexican econ-
omy after NAFTA and sketched three migration scenarios. In 1982, they
estimated there were 2.5 million unauthorized Mexicans in the United
States, the cost of migrating illegally from Mexico to the United States
was $1,200 (in the form of smuggling costs and lost earnings), and the
U.S. earnings premium was $3,000 a year-unauthorized Mexicans
earned $4,000 a year in the United States, and $1,000 a year in Mexico.
5. One reason this argument was made was to urge the United States and Mexican
governments to create a North American Development Bank to spur job creation
in especially rural Mexico. NADBank was created in 1994 to invest in water,
sewer and trash disposal projects to improve the border-area environment; loans
are limited to sixty miles on each side of the border. Despite having raised $304
million in the six years to 2001, NADBank made just seven loans, totaling $11
million, largely because: (1) U.S. communities can borrow more cheaply by float-
ing bonds; and (2) Mexican law does not permit communities to issue bond debt to
be repaid with user charges, as in the U.S. In Mexico, where sewers and water
systems are being introduced, it is hard to set rates and collect payments.
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They sketched three migration scenarios: (1) no more unauthorized Mex-
ico-U.S. migration, (2) 4 million Mexican illegals, and (3) 5 million Mexi-
can illegals, and they argued that the middle scenario could be achieved
with NAFTA and a new guest worker program (what they called "man-
aged interdependence").
Martin (1993) examined NAFTA's likely impacts on Mexican and U.S.
agriculture. Most Mexican-born U.S. residents are from rural areas in
Mexico, and most have their first U.S. jobs on farms. After examining
how demand-pull factors in the United States and supply-push factors in
Mexico would likely evolve after NAFTA, Martin concluded that the flow
of Mexicans to the United States, running at 200,000 settlers and 1 to 2
million sojourners a year in the early 1990s, would increase by 10 to 30
percent for five to fifteen years, producing a hump when Mexico-U.S.
migration was viewed over time. The upward slope of the hump in the
1990s was due primarily to previous demographic growth in Mexico, in-
sufficient jobs and displacement in Mexico, and strong United States de-
mand for Mexican workers. The downward slope of the hump was
expected to occur when the number of new labor force entrants fell and
economic growth created more and better-paid jobs in Mexico. The Clin-
ton Administration used the migration hump to argue that Congress
should approve NAFTA because the additional migration in the 1990s-
the hump-was a reasonable price to pay in the short run for less Mexico-
U.S. migration in the long run.
The migration hump is pictured in Figure 1, where the solid line
through B represents the status-quo migration flow (without NAFTA and
other changes) and the arced line above A depicts a migration hump-
the volume of migration is measured on the Y-axis and time on the X-
axis. Economic integration leads to an increase in migration over the sta-
tus quo trajectory-the number of additional migrants is represented by
A. However, economic integration also speeds up economic and job
growth in Mexico, so that migration falls and the volume of migration
returns to the status quo level at B, in this case after fifteen years. As
growth continues, migration continues to fall, and area C represents the
migration avoided by economic integration. Eventually, some migrants
may return from abroad, Mexico, or another previously emigration coun-
try may attract immigrants from other countries, the area represented by
D, as occurred in previous emigration countries including Italy, Spain,
and South Korea.
The critical policy parameters in a migration hump are A, B, and C-
(1) how much additional migration results from economic integration
(A); (2) how soon does migration return to the status quo level (B); and
(3) how much migration is "avoided or saved" by economic integration
and other changes (C)? Generally, a pre-existing migration relationship
and three factors must be present for economic integration to lead to a
migration hump: a continued demand-pull for migrants in the destination
country, an increased supply-push in the country of origin, and migration
2005]
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Trade Theory and the Migration Hump
networks that can move workers across borders. Comparative static anal-
yses-comparisons of before and after equilibrium points-usually ignore
the adjustments that occur during economic integration, implicitly assum-
ing that trade is a substitute for migration in the short and long term. The
migration hump, by contrast, is a short-run relationship between eco-
nomic integration and migration.
Standard trade theory allows trade and migration to be complements
when basic assumptions, including identical production technologies; fac-
tor homogeneity; constant returns to scale; instantaneous adjustment; and
perfect competition, full employment, and complete markets, are relaxed.
For example, if a country in the North (N) is capital rich, and a country in
the South (S) is capital poor, the two countries share the same technolo-
gies or production functions, the same two factors of production, capital
and labor, and produce the same two goods, free trade means that each
country will export the good that is more intensive in the factor that is
relatively more abundant. Country N will import labor-intensive goods
from Country S, and Country S will import capital-intensive goods from
Country N. Stolper and Samuelson considered the effect on factor prices
(wages and the return on capital) of an import tariff that increases the
domestic price of the import-competing good relative to that of the ex-
port good. Under the Heckscher-Ohlin assumptions, plus the assumption
that the underlying trade pattern is not altered by the tariff, an import
tariff increases the real reward of the relatively-scarce factor and lowers
the real reward of the other factor, or a tariff levied against labor-inten-
sive imports in Country N will increase Country-N wages. Migration in
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response to international wage differentials means that protectionism in
Country N should increase migration from the South, or the protection of
capital-intensive industries in the South should spur emigration. Trade
liberalization, on the other hand, shifts the production of labor-intensive
goods to Country S and capital-intensive goods to Country N, which in
turn puts upward pressure on Country-S wages, discouraging emigration.
However, if there are technology differences between countries, trade
and migration can be substitutes. Corn in Mexico has been highly pro-
tected, and a guaranteed price of corn that was twice the world price has
been the social safety net in rural areas. Mexico had about 3 million corn
farmers in the mid-1990s, but the 75,000 corn farmers in Iowa produced
twice as much corn as Mexico, at half the price. The United States pro-
duced about ten times more corn than Mexico and, using herbicides and
other capital inputs, can export corn to Mexico cheaper than corn can be
produced there. This example highlights the fact that, if the basis for
trade is differences in technology, trade and migration may be comple-
ments, for example, trade in computers and software may be accompa-
nied by the migration of computer specialists.
Factor productivity differences between countries are one reason to
trade, but reasons for productivity differences can help to explain migra-
tion behavior. Suppose Mexican workers are more productive in the
United States than they are in Mexico because of better public and pri-
vate infrastructure. In such cases, migration can complement trade, as
occurred when much of the Mexican shoe industry moved from Leon,
Mexico to Los Angeles, California in the 1980s, with the result that shoes
produced with Mexican workers in Los Angeles were exported to Mexico
more easily when NAFTA lowered barriers to trade. Migration, by con-
verting less productive Mexican workers into more productive U.S. work-
ers, in this case, discouraged the production of a labor-intensive good in
Mexico, and encouraged migration to the United States.
A third assumption of the standard trade model is that (identical) pro-
duction functions in the two countries exhibit constant returns to scale.
However, if costs of production fall as output expands, especially in U.S.
industries that employ Mexican migrant workers, economic integration
may expand U.S. production, thereby increasing the demand-pull for mi-
grants in the United States. The availability of Mexican workers enabled
some U.S. meatpacking and poultry processing plants, located close to
sources of low-cost animal feed, to add second shifts, lowering meatpack-
ing costs and increasing meat exports to Mexico, which displaced some
Mexican farmers and workers. When the basis of trade is economies of
scale, migration and trade can be complements.
The fourth assumption of the standard trade model is that adjustments
to changing prices and wages are instantaneous. However, economic in-
tegration may displace workers faster than new jobs are created or dis-
place workers in one area and create jobs in another. For example,
freeing up trade in corn or meat may displace Mexican farmers, but there
2005]
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may be few jobs created in the areas where they live. Instead, the new
jobs created via economic integration may be in border-area maqui-
ladoras, which may prefer to hire young women, not older ex-farmers. If
the displaced farmers have better network connections to the U.S. labor
market than to Mexican labor markets, there may be more migration de-
spite more trade and job creation.
The fifth assumption of trade theory is that markets are perfect; there is
full information, no risk, and no transaction costs. The new economics of
labor migration is based on relaxing this assumption. It imagines, for ex-
ample, a rural family viewing household members as portfolio of re-
sources, and maximizes earnings and minimizes risks by, for example,
having one member in the United States, one in a Mexican urban labor
market, and one on the farm, so that there are three streams of income
rather than one. The remittances that enable some families to buy TVs
may encourage other families to send a migrant abroad so that they can
keep up with the neighbors in consumption (Taylor and Martin, 2001).
III. MEXICO-U.S. MIGRATION IN THE 1990S
Trade and migration were complements in the Mexico-U.S. case in the
1990s, but not all of the increase in Mexican-born U.S. residents during
the 1990s was due to NAFTA. Between 1991 and 2000, some 2.2 million
Mexicans were admitted as legal immigrants and 15 million foreigners, 95
percent Mexicans, were apprehended just inside the U.S. border.6
Mexico needs formal sector job creation to reduce emigration. There
are about 109 million Mexican-born persons, and 8 percent of them live
in the United States; more importantly, 30 percent of Mexicans with for-
mal-sector jobs are in the United States.7 In 2000, 15 million of the 40
million-strong Mexican labor force had formal sector jobs; with an addi-
tional 6 million Mexican-born workers in the United States, 29 percent of
Mexicans with formal sector jobs are in the United States.
Much of the recent formal sector job growth in Mexico was in maqui-
ladoras, foreign-owned plants in border areas that import components
duty free, assemble them into goods, and then export the goods. The
value added in Mexico-wages and utilities-is typically 10 to 20 percent
6. Some individuals were caught several times, and some eluded the US Border Pa-
trol, but gross flows of Mexicans to the United States for legal and unauthorized
settlement or employment are over 1 million a year.
7. There are about 15 million foreign-born workers in the U.S. labor force of 142
million, including 5 to 6 million Mexican-born workers. Mexico has a labor force
of 40 million, but many Mexican workers are self-employed farmers, unpaid family
workers, or in the informal sector-the usual indicator of formal sector employ-
ment in Mexico is enrollment in the pension system (IMSS). In 2001, there were
12.4 million Mexican workers enrolled in IMSS; their number was forecast to rise
to 13.1 million in 2003 (http://www.banamex.com/weblogic/svltC7193OEstSE?LNG
=1&SEQ=3&folio=5). If there are 5.5 million Mexicans employed in the United
States, and 13 million in IMSS in Mexico, 30% of Mexicans with formal-sector jobs
are in the United States.
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TABLE 4.
MEXICO-U.S. POPULATION AND LABOR FORCE, 1970-2000
Mexico U.S.
Population (Mils)-1970 53 203
Labor Force (Mils)-1970 15 83
% of population 28% 41%
Population (Mils)-2000 100 281
Labor Force (Mils) 2000 40 141
% of population 40% 50%
Labor Force Increase 167% 70%
Employment-2000
Formal Sector Jobs (Mils) 15 125
Filled by Mexicans 15 6
Employed in Ag (Mils) 6 3
Filled by Mexicans 6 2
Population (Mils)-2050 151 414
Labor Force (Mils) 2050 70 207
% of population 46% 50%
Labor Force Increase 174% 146%
Sources: US Census and Conapo, 2050 projections from PRB
IMSS Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social. Subdirecci6n General de
Finanzas.
of the value of the finished good.8 The number of maquiladoras and their
employment increased sharply after several peso devaluations in the
1980s and reached a peak of 1.3 million in 2000.9 During the summer of
2001, the state of Baja California posted signs on the border advising mi-
grants attempting an illegal crossing to the United States that read: "Mi-
grant Friend: Don't put yourself at risk. Baja Californians will give you a
hand."
Maquiladoras never fulfilled their original goal of creating jobs for ex-
Braceros. The Braceros were young men, while most maquiladora work-
ers were young women-over 60 percent in 2000. Maquiladoras pre-
ferred to hire young women from the interior, many of whom were in
their first jobs, believing that the young women were more likely to be
satisfied with assembly-line work. Nonetheless, maquiladoras have very
high worker turnover; in many maquilas, two workers must be hired dur-
8. The maquiladora or Border Industrialization Program was launched in 1965 to
provide jobs for ex-Braceros and their families that had moved to the border to be
closer to U.S. farm jobs, and they had no source of income with the end of the
Bracero program. Many Braceros moved to the border area to increase their
chance of being selected. The U.S. employer had to pay transportation from the
workers' place of recruitment to the US job, and employers thus preferred border-
area workers.
9. There were twelve maquiladoras employing 3,000 workers in 1965; 600 employing
120,000 workers in 1980; 2,000 employing 472,000 workers in 1990; and 4,000 em-
ploying a peak 1.3 million workers in fall 2000-maquiladora exports of $53 billion
surpassed oil as Mexico's leading source of foreign exchange in 1998.
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ing the year to keep one job slot filled, an annual turnover rate of 100
percent. High turnover is attributed by many analysts to uniform wages
and benefits, that is, there is little cost to workers who change factories.
Maquiladora wages in dollar terms in 2003 were below 1994 levels.
During the late 1990s, many Mexicans migrated northward with maqui-
ladora expansion, but there is little smoking gun evidence of stepping-
stone migration, in which internal migrants to border areas become U.S.
migrants. The clearest evidence of such migration involves the 100,000 or
more indigenous Mexicans, Mixtecs, and Oaxacans from southern Mex-
ico, who were recruited to work in Mexico's export-oriented vegetable
industry in Sinaloa and Baja California in the 1980s and 1990s. Their
seasonal jobs end in the spring, just as the demand for farm workers in
the United States rises, and some of them were recruited and later contin-
ued on their own to the United States to work in agriculture. One survey
of Mixtec workers in the United States in the late 1980s found that two-
thirds had worked in northern Mexico's export-oriented agriculture
before arriving in the United States (Zabin et. al. 1993).
IV. MANAGING MEXICO-U.S. MIGRATION
The migration hump has both an up and a down side. Many pessimists
look at the 1990s upside of the migration hump and see only continued
high levels of Mexico-U.S. migration. But Mexico-U.S. migration may
fall faster than expected for demographic and economic reasons. As a
result, the U.S. border control build up may be completed between 2005
and 2010 just as Mexico-U.S. migration begins to fall for other reasons,
and enforcement may get the credit that demography and economics
deserve.
Mexico's population is growing by 2 percent a year. Mexican popula-
tion growth peaked at 3.3 percent a year in 1970, but in 1974, the Mexican
government launched a family planning program that resulted in a sharp
drop in fertility, from an average 7 children per woman in 1965 to 2.5 by
2000. Declining fertility reduces migration directly and indirectly, be-
cause households with fewer children tend to keep them in school longer,
reducing the need to create jobs for young people entering the labor mar-
ket, and more educated Mexicans are less likely to emigrate.
Past demographic growth presents Mexico with a major job creation
challenge. The number of Mexicans turning fifteen (the age of labor
force entry in Mexico) is expected to drop 50 percent between 1996 and
2010, from 1 million a year to 500,000 a year. The rate of growth is pro-
jected to drop from 1 to 1.3 percent a year to 0.4 to 0.7 percent a year by
2010. Sustained economic growth, on the other hand, can create enough
jobs for new labor force entrants so that fewer Mexicans will feel com-
pelled to emigrate. At 5 percent sustained GDP growth, employment
growth is expected to rise from 0.9 to 1.3 percent per year between 1996
and 2010, and with 4 percent growth from 0.7 to 1 percent a year. Mexico
may be able to create jobs at an even faster pace: Appendix Table 1
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shows that, between 1992 and 2001, GDP growth, labor force growth, and
employment growth averaged 3 percent a year, while IMSS or formal sec-
tor job growth averaged 4 percent a year.
The combination of fewer work force entrants and rising employment
forms an X, where the falling number of entrants equals employment
growth. Projections made in the mid-1990s imagined the X-crossing be-
ing reached in 2002, when labor force growth of 1.1 percent matched em-
ployment growth of 1.1 percent. GDP growth averaged less than 4
percent, so the X-crossing is not likely to be reached until after 2005, but
the point made by the X-diagram is clear-emigration pressures in Mex-
ico are likely to fall between 2005 and 2010 for demographic and eco-
nomic reasons. If the U.S. Border Patrol buildup is completed just as
emigration pressures fall, we must be careful to credit the real reason for
the drop-demography and jobs.
TABLE 5/FIG. MEXICO: GROWTH OF 16-44 YEAR OLDS AND
EMPLOYMENT GROWTH: 1996-2010
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Job growth in Mexico is likely to match labor force growth by 2005-06
V. GUEST WORKERS, LEGALIZATION,
EARNED LEGALIZATION
How should Mexico-U.S. migration be managed until the X is crossed
and emigration pressures begin to fall? The three major U.S. migration
policy options are guest workers, earned legalization, and legalization.
Ex-Senator Phil Gramm (R-TX) in 2001 proposed a guest worker pro-
gram that would permit unauthorized Mexicans in the United States, and
Mexican workers in Mexico, to obtain either seasonal or year-round work
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permits that would make them legal U.S. workers.10 Gramm's proposal
would have given unauthorized workers and their U.S. employers six
months to register for the new program, and then enforcement of em-
ployer sanctions laws would have been stepped up to encourage employ-
ers and workers to participate. The 15.3 percent of gross wages paid by
U.S. employers and workers in Social Security taxes would have been
diverted to a fund to provide emergency medical care for guest workers,
with any remaining balance placed in individual IRA-type accounts from
which Mexican workers could receive payments when they gave up their
counterfeit-resistant work permits in Mexico.
The other extreme is legalization for unauthorized workers. The AFL-
CIO in 2001 called for a general legalization for unauthorized foreigners
in the United States, an end to enforcement of employer sanctions laws
and stepped up enforcement of labor laws, but no new guest-worker pro-
gram. Rep. Luis V. Gutierrez (D-IL) in 2001 introduced the U.S. Em-
ployee, Family Unity and Legalization Act, which would have granted
temporary legal status to persons in the United States before February 6,
2000, and immediate immigrant status to persons in the United States
before February 6, 1996. The legalization date would then roll forward a
year in each of the next five years, eventually encompassing all of those
illegally in the United States in 2001.
The third option is earned legalization. Senator Bob Graham (D-FL)
proposed an earned legalization program for agriculture, the Agricultural
Job Opportunity Benefits and Security Act (AgJOBS). In December
2000, AgJOBS was endorsed by the United Farm Workers and the Na-
tional Council of Agricultural Employers but was subsequently blocked
by ex-Senator Phil Gramm (R-TX). To become an AgJOBS temporary
resident, an unauthorized foreigner would have had to do at least 100
days of farm work in the previous year. Then, after satisfying a three-part
farm work test that included doing at least 360 days of farm work over
the next six years, including 240 days in the first three years, AgJOBS
temporary residents and their families could become immigrants in five
to six years. President Bush in 2001 seemed to endorse earned legaliza-
tion when he said he was "willing to consider ways for a guest worker to
earn green-card status" (Brownstein, 2001).
The Graham AgJOBS proposal would have applied only to agriculture.
In fall 2002, Rep. Richard A. Gephardt (D-MO) introduced a general
earned legalization program, the Earned Legalization and Family
Reunification Act, to legalize the status of foreigners who had been: (1)
physically present in the United States for at least five years; and (2) who
had worked in the United States for at least two years. Legalization ap-
plicants would have to demonstrate some knowledge of English and pass
10. Seasonal workers would have an indefinite right to depart and return to the
United States. Year-round workers could work in the United States three consec-
utive years, but would then have to stay in Mexico at least a year before returning.
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a federal security check in order to convert their provisional status to a
regular immigrant status.
President Bush, on January 7, 2004, unveiled an earned guest worker
program that would permit the 6 to 8 million unauthorized foreigners in
the United States with jobs to become temporary legal residents, free to
travel in and out of the United States, obtain social security numbers and
driver's licenses, and to apply for immigrant visas. The Fair and Secure
Immigration Reform program aims to fulfill Bush's goal of "matching
willing foreign workers with willing U.S. employers when no American
can be found to fill those jobs" (White House, 2004).
A U.S. official gave this example of how the program would work.
Someone is working illegally at Holiday Inn, which acknowledges [most
likely in a letter or affidavit to DHS] that "she's been working here as of
such and such date. [After registration] that person is now legal, let's say,
for the three years of this program" (U.S. DOS, 2004). To become legal,
the unauthorized worker would take the employer's letter to DHS, pay a
registration fee of $1,000 to $2,000, and receive a three-year renewable
visa. Bush administration officials emphasized that "there is no linkage
between participation in this program and a green card [immigrant
visa] . .. one must go home upon conclusion of the program" and then
apply for an immigrant visa (U.S. DOS, 2004).
The number of green cards or immigrant visas available for U.S. em-
ployers who cannot find U.S. workers, currently 140,000 a year for work-
ers and their families, would increase by some undetermined number, but
there could still be long waits for employers seeking immigrant visas for
needed foreign workers. For example, if 5 million unauthorized workers
sought an additional 100,000 employment-based immigrant visas a year, it
would take fifty years to convert all of them to immigrants.
The Bush plan also includes a new guest worker program for "the jobs
being generated in America's growing economy [that] American citizens
are not filling" (White House, 2004). The plan would allow U.S. employ-
ers to advertise jobs on a new internet labor exchange, and if no U.S.
worker accepted, the employer could go abroad and get guest workers.
These guest works would receive three-year renewable visas like those
issued to unauthorized workers in the United States, but guest workers
from outside the United States would not have to pay the registration fee
charged to unauthorized workers already in the country.
Most observers said that Bush is likely to win points with U.S. Hispan-
ics for what the White House called "a more humane, safe, orderly and
legal immigration policy" (White House Press Briefing, 2004) Mexican
President Vicente Fox said Bush's plan represented "a clear recognition
of the value of these Mexicans who are working there in the United
States" (Sullivan, 2004). Most U.S. employers welcomed the Bush plan
for potentially offering an easier way to obtain guest workers, while un-
ions were wary, emphasizing that Bush did not propose minimum wages
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or government-supervised recruitment of U.S. workers, making it easy
for U.S. employers to recruit "cheap labor" abroad.
Critics seized on the fact that an immigrant visa may not become avail-
able before the temporary status runs out, saying that Bush's proposal "is
more likely to ensure their departure [unauthorized workers who regis-
ter] than ensure their permanent residency" (Bumiller, 2004). Critics em-
phasized that there are long waits before immigration visas become
available for unskilled workers sponsored by U.S. employers, and that
without a 245(i) program, which allows foreigners in the United States
when their immigrant visas become available to pay a fee and adjust their
status in the United States, some of the workers returning to their coun-
tries of origin to receive an immigrant visa may be barred from legal re-
entry for ten years because they were in the United States illegally.
VI. COOPERATIVE MIGRATION MANAGEMENT?
There is a search for a new "Big Idea" to accelerate North American
economic integration, for which Hufbauer and Vega-Canovas (2002) sug-
gested a "Common Frontier" project that would lead to cooperative bor-
der management, a defense alliance, and immigration reforms that aim to
stabilize the stock of Mexicans in the United States and legalize the flow
of any additional Mexico-U.S. migrants. Their "Big Idea" involves con-
cepts that are likely to take time to negotiate. The suggestions below
could be implemented much sooner, and they recommend that the best
way to manage Mexico-U.S. migration until the downward side of the
migration hump appears is with a three part strategy to:
* Promote a secure and efficient border that facilitates the movement
of legitimate people and goods and deters unauthorized migration
and smuggling, thereby helping the United States to achieve its se-
curity goals and helping both countries to reduce crime and violence
along the border;
" Enhance Mexican governmental efforts to reduce the cost of remit-
ting money to Mexico and increasing the economic development im-
pacts of savings remitted by Mexicans in the United States; and
* Experiment with pilot guest worker programs to allow currently em-
ployed unauthorized Mexican workers, as well as future Mexican en-
trants, to obtain legal work permits, and to include economic
instruments in these pilot programs that encourage returns and spur
development.
Mexico and the United States share the goal of facilitating legitimate
flows of people and goods over their 2,000-mile long border, a goal they
can achieve with pre-screening and trusted traveler and transporter pro-
grams that allow expedited entries. Both countries can benefit by ex-
panding the number of people and firms in such trust-expedite programs,
so that limited enforcement resources can be targeted on others who may
pose a danger. As Hufbauer and Vega-Canovas suggest, doing inspec-
tions of trusted travelers before they arrive at the border, and inspecting
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goods away from the border, facilitates the movement of trusted travelers
and goods.11
Mexico has been a pioneer in recognizing the contributions that its citi-
zens in the United States can provide to foster economic development in
Mexico. President Fox has called migrants in the United States heroes
for the $10 billion a year they remit to Mexico, and said that the migrants
were indispensable to creating a modern and prosperous Mexico. Mexi-
can governments in the 1990s launched policies that include issuing ma-
tricula consular documents to Mexicans in the United States, so that they
have a government-issued ID card to open bank accounts, rent apart-
ments, and operate in a security-conscious United States,12 educating
Mexicans in the United States about the options and costs available for
remitting money to Mexico, and encouraging competition among money
transfer firms to lower the costs of remitting savings. Finally, Mexican
federal, state, and local governments have developed programs to match
remittance savings that are invested to spur economic development in mi-
grant areas' of origin. These efforts should be strengthened and enlarged.
VII. PILOT GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS?
The third component of a new cooperative migration relationship is
pilot guest worker programs.1 3 The United States has about twenty non-
immigrant programs that allow the admission of foreigners for temporary
periods to work, issuing visas that range from A for ambassadors to TN
for NAFTA professionals with a BA or more. Most Mexicans entering
the United States legally as guest workers arrive with H-2A and H-2B
visas, for farm workers and unskilled non-farm workers, respectively, to
work temporarily in temporary or seasonal U.S. jobs (double temporary
criterion).
The H-2A and H-2B programs are certification programs, meaning that
a U.S. employer must convince the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) on
a job-by-job basis that U.S. workers are not available. Each job vacancy
to be filled by a foreign worker with an H-2A or H-2B visa needs a DOL
certification that U.S. workers are not available to fill the job despite
DOL-supervised employer recruitment efforts. Certification means the
border gate to foreign workers remains closed until the government
11. Hufbauer and Vega-Canovas include their trusted traveler proposal with immigra-
tion, and call for the creation of a NAFTA retirement visa that would allow retire-
ment in any of the three NAFTrA countries.
12. Mexico's 47 U.S. consulates have been issuing matricula consular cards to Mexi-
cans in the US for $29; over 600,000 were issued in 2001, and 1 million in 2002.
13. Hufbauer and Vega-Canovas call for a general guest worker program that would
issue up to 300,000 visas a year to Mexicans after they undergo a background
check, require them to have at least eight months of employment in the United
States, and allow them to naturalize after five years-normally, legal immigrants
must live in the United States five years to naturalize. For unauthorized Mexicans
in the United States, after illegal crossings are reduced, unauthorized Mexicans in
the United States could obtain a temporary legal status, and naturalize after five
years.
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agrees or certifies that Americans are unavailable. The alternative attes-
tation process, as used in the H-lB program to admit foreigners with a
BA or more to fill U.S. jobs that require a BA or more for up to six years,
allows a U.S. employer to open the border gate by asserting or attesting
that foreign workers are needed to fill vacant jobs. There is generally no
enforcement of employer attestations unless DOL receives complaints.
Under H-1B, H-2A, and H-2B programs, foreign workers are tied to a
single U.S. employer by contracts-the employer's job offer becomes the
contract-and must generally leave the United States if they are
discharged.
The purpose of nonimmigrant or guest worker programs is to add
workers temporarily to the labor force, but not settled residents to the
population; the guest adjective implies that the foreigner is expected to
leave the country when his job ends. In most cases, guest workers are to
be a transitional presence in an industry or occupation, employed until
jobs are mechanized or replaced by trade or until additional workers are
trained locally. Proposals for twenty-first century guest worker programs
include:
* allowing employers of unskilled workers to attest to their need for
such workers;
" allowing unskilled foreign workers to change U.S. employers; and
* introducing economic mechanisms to improve employer and worker
compliance with program rules.
The United States and Mexico could usefully experiment with new
guest worker programs on a pilot basis to determine whether alternatives
to the current H-2A and H-2B programs are viable, and whether Mexico-
U.S. cooperation can reduce unauthorized migration so that workers and
employers are legal rather than illegal.
Three U.S. industries that currently hire large numbers of unauthorized
Mexican workers might be candidates for such pilot guest worker pro-
grams. The U.S. meatpacking industry has high worker turnover among
the 400,000 workers who "disassemble" cattle, hogs, and poultry. Most
meatpacking firms are enrolled in the voluntary Basic Pilot employee
verification program, under which employers submit the INS-issued A-
numbers of newly hired non-U.S. citizen workers for verification of their
right to work in the United States.
Many meatpackers, including Tyson Foods, also employ workers sup-
plied by temp agencies, and these workers' data may not be submitted to
Basic Pilot. Tyson, the largest U.S. meatpacker with 120,000 employees,
was charged in 2001 with conspiracy to smuggle unauthorized workers
into the United States when plant managers made arrangements with INS
undercover agents to pay $200 for each worker who then went to work in
Tyson plants as employees of temp firms. The federal government
charged Tyson with conspiracy to smuggle aliens into the United States
and sought $100 million and changes in hiring methods. Tyson main-
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tained that a few rogue managers were responsible and was acquitted of
the charges in March 2003.
A pilot guest worker program that relaxed the double-temporary re-
quirement of the H-2B program in exchange for meatpackers hiring all
workers directly and screening them in Basic Pilot could be linked with
mechanisms to avoid long-term employer dependence and encourage re-
turns. A pilot H-2BB program could isolate the Social Security and un-
employment insurance taxes paid by U.S. employers and guest workers
and: (1) use the employer's contributions to enforce program rules, subsi-
dize mechanization research and train U.S. workers and (2) return the
worker's Social Security contributions when he returns his work permit in
Mexico. Both efforts could be supplemented with other steps to ensure
compliance and achieve longer term goals. For example, Mexico could
select guest workers from among those participating in Opportunidades
(ex-Progresa program), a program that gives poor Mexicans cash pay-
ments. Payments or health check up dates could be adjusted to ensure
compliance with guest worker rules.
The U.S. L-1 visa is available to "key employees," executives, manag-
ers and workers with "specialized knowledge," to allow them to move
from a job in a multinational corporation abroad to a job in a U.S.
branch, parent, subsidiary, or affiliated entity. On a pilot basis, multina-
tional firms with operations in both Mexico and the United States could
be permitted to use L-1X visas to bring unskilled Mexican workers to the
United States for employment and training, in the expectation that the
Mexican worker would return to Mexico and be employed in the firm's
Mexican operation after one to three years. Such a program involving
hotels, medical care providers, and other services would provide con-
tinuity in employee seniority with one firm, and make the multinational
firm a partner in ensuring that program rules are followed.
The third pilot guest worker program would involve agriculture. Sea-
sonal employment on U.S. crop farms has been the port of entry for many
Mexican-born U.S. residents, and 85 percent of the almost 2 million hired
seasonal employees on U.S. crop farms were born in Mexico. An agricul-
tural pilot program could test methods of using payroll taxes collected
from participating guest workers and their U.S. employers to encourage
worker returns as well as promote the mechanization or other changes in
the farm labor market that are increasingly necessary because of in-
creased global competition in labor-intensive commodities.
For example, 95 percent of U.S. raisins are grown around Fresno, Cali-
fornia by about 3,500 farmers, many of whom have relatively small plots
that average forty acres. Workers receive about $0.01 a pound for cutting
and laying twenty-five pounds of green grapes on paper trays to dry in the
sun. There is a "labor shortage" every year as farmers wait as long as
possible to begin harvesting in order to raise the sugar content of their
grapes, knowing that the longer they wait to begin harvesting, the more
likely the drying grapes will be rained on, which lowers their value. Dried
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on the vine (DOV) systems for mechanically harvesting raisin grapes in-
crease the hours of labor needed for pruning in the winter months, when
unemployment is high, and reduce the need for harvest workers. How-
ever, the up-front cost of retrofitting vineyards for mechanical DOV har-
vesting is about $1,500 per acre, or a total $225 million for the 150,000
acres of raisin grapes. If the DOV system were adopted, peak September
employment in the raisin industry would fall from 50,000 to 10,000, and a
magnet for unauthorized Mexican workers would disappear.
A pilot guest worker program in which employer contributions for So-
cial Security and Unemployment Insurance (UI) were isolated and used
to subsidize mechanization and encourage returns could generate signifi-
cant funds to transform the industry, provide transitional jobs for Mexi-
can migrants, and spur development in the migrants' areas of origin.
14
The 20 percent of wages paid by employers and workers for Social Secur-
ity (15 percent of gross wages) and UI (5 percent) could generate signifi-
cant funds to achieve these goals. For example, if raisin harvesters
average $5,000 each, 20 percent payroll taxes are $1,000 per worker per
season. The worker's share of these taxes are about $375, and the em-
ployer's share $625-if the money were divided fifty-fifty, then the em-
ployment of 50,000 guest workers would generate a total $50 million to
subsidize mechanization and encourage returns.
More broadly, if there are 4 million unauthorized Mexican workers,
and they were converted to guest workers earning an average of $15,000 a
year, the 20 percent payroll taxes accounted for by Social Security and UI
would generate $3,000 a year per worker, or a total $12 billion a year
from gross earnings of $60 billion. This significant sum could be used to
promote labor-saving mechanization and worker training or retraining in
the United States, as well encourage returns and foster economic devel-
opment in Mexico.
None of these pilot programs could achieve their goals unless illegal
migration is reduced. As long as Mexicans can enter the United States
illegally and find jobs, there will be little incentive for Mexican workers
or U.S. employers to participate in pilot guest worker programs, even if
they promise return bonuses for workers and other assistance for employ-
ers. Reducing illegal migration and employment is a prerequisite for any
new guest worker or migration arrangement.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The number of international migrants is relatively small. In a world of
six billion, the United Nations (UN) estimates the number of interna-
14. Yields average about eight tons of green grapes per acre, which dry into two tons
of raisins. Workers are paid about one cent a pound for picking green grapes, so
labor costs are about $160 per acre, and payroll taxes of 22 percent are $35 an acre.
If guest workers received $10 an acre in refunded contributions, or a total $1.5
million, then $15 an acre or a total $2.25 million would be available to better en-
force program rules and subsidize the inevitable change to a mechanized harvest-
ing system.
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tional migrants-persons outside their country of birth or citizenship-at
175 million in 2000, 3 percent of global residents. Mexico-U.S. migration
is larger-about 9 percent of Mexican-born persons live in the United
States.
The economic integration symbolized by NAFTA should eventually re-
duce economically motivated Mexico-U.S. migration. However, in the
short run, migration and trade can increase together, producing a migra-
tion hump when migration levels are viewed over time. NAFTA went
into effect in January 1994, in part to enable Mexico to export, in the
words of ex-President Salinas, tomatoes rather than tomato pickers.
However, during the 1990s, Mexico-U.S. trade and migration increased
together because of large numbers of new labor force entrants, very une-
ven economic and job growth in Mexico, and an economic boom in the
United States that provided a demand-pull for Mexicans with U.S.
contacts.
High levels of Mexico-U.S. migration over the past decade should not
obscure the fact that Mexico-U.S. migration may soon diminish for demo-
graphic and economic reasons. A combination of the sharp drop in Mexi-
can fertility in the 1980s and 1990s, the potential for sustained economic
and job growth in Mexico, and the completion of the exodus of surplus
workers from Mexican agriculture should reduce Mexico-U.S. migration
after 2010. If reduced Mexico-U.S. migration is apparent just as the
United States completes its stepped-up border controls, it will be impor-
tant to credit the real reason for the decline-the demographic and eco-
nomic factors.
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